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INEFFICIENT CUSTOMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
EUGENE KONTOROVICH*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores whether and when rules of customary
international law (CIL) can be expected to be efficient. Customary
rules are often regarded as desirable because in certain circum-
stances, they promote the welfare of the group in which they arise.
Unless these circumstances apply among states, the efficiency
arguments for the legalization of customary norms do not apply.
The Article takes as its central observation the divergent treatment
of custom in domestic and international law. In international law,
if a customary behavior of states can be identified, it is automatically
elevated to the status of legal obligation without any independent
examination of whether the custom is a good one. International
custom is customary international law. This reification of custom is
in marked contrast to the treatment of custom in private law. No one
doubts that customary behaviors exist in various societal subgroups,
but tort law does not assume that customs are normatively desirable,
and does not automatically transform customs into legally binding
obligations. Thus tort law does not take custom to dictate the
standard of care; the fact-finder must independently determine
whether the practice is efficient, though its customary status has
some positive evidentiary value.
Law and economics scholars have varied views about whether
custom is presumptively efficient in the private law context. The most
optimistic view holds that private custom will generally be welfare
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enhancing, and thus courts should give legal recognition to such
practices. Yet even the optimistic view holds that efficient custom
would only arise in certain circumstances: when there are thickly
repeated dealings between members of an insular, homogenous group
whose members play reciprocal roles. 
The Article takes these earmarks of efficient custom and examines
whether they apply to international custom. It finds that much of
international custom should not be expected to be efficient even in the
most optimistic view of custom. Some areas of CIL, like diplomatic
privileges, might satisfy efficient custom criteria. This suggests that,
contrary to current practice, CIL should not be treated as one
undifferentiated phenomenon. Rather, the standards for establishing
a CIL norm should vary across different substantive contexts and
different groups of states. 
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1. See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L.
115, 116 & n.1 (2005) (observing that CIL “is central to our understanding of international
law” and listing some matters “governed wholly or partially by CIL” such as state
responsibility, foreign direct investment, jurisdiction, human rights, and immunities). 
2. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1984)
(“[I]n the general theory of international law, customary law is positive law no less than
conventional law.”).
3. See T.O. Elias, New Trends in Contemporary International Law, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF THE JOSEPHINE ONOH MEMORIAL LECTURES
1, 1 (David Freestone et al. eds., 2002).
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. I,
ch. 1, introductory note at 18, 19 (1987) (observing that CIL develops “slowly and unevenly,
out of action and reaction,” in contrast to the “purposeful” lawmaking through treaty).
INTRODUCTION
Custom is one of the two sources of international law and, in some
areas, the only source of international norms.1 Thus whether
customary international law (CIL) improves the welfare of nations
is a significant question. However, customs are not designed to
improve welfare or for any other normative goal. They are not
designed at all, but rather emerge from a system of interactions
within a group. This Article shows that there is little reason to
expect that international customs will improve states’ joint welfare.
Although most legal systems operate against a backdrop of
custom, they differ in the deference they show to it. Some legal
systems give no deference to customary norms or even seek to
undermine them. The common law takes a middle course, looking
to custom but also often overriding it. International law lies at the
other extreme. It reifies custom. International law (IL) automati-
cally transforms customary norms into binding legal obligations.2
International law is regarded as a progressive, liberalizing force.3
Custom is generally seen as conservative, even reactionary. The
champions of custom as a source of law are Burke and Hayek, not
Rousseau and Dworkin. This makes IL’s unparalleled reliance on
custom surprising. Customary norms develop slowly, through a mix
of tradition and incremental modification, through the uncoordi-
nated actions of numerous private parties.4 Custom is a form of
privatized lawmaking, whereby the regulated actors gradually
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5. See infra Part I.B.
6. The proposed Third Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm states that
“[w]hile [an] actor is entitled to present to the jury evidence showing that the actor complied
with custom, the other party is free to present other evidence, ... and in doing so seek to
establish that the actor’s conduct lacks reasonable care.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 13 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
7. Efficiency in this Article is meant in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. When a norm is said to
be inefficient here, it does not mean that it is not a Nash equilibrium, but rather that it fails
to improve welfare. Any discussion of the efficiency effects of a norm is relative to the default
situation. The default may be another norm, or no norm. In international law, the default
position is no norm. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19 (Sept.
7) (holding that in the absence of CIL or treaty, there are no restrictions on state conduct).
There are some potential sources of alternate norms, such as international tribunals, but their
coverage is not as broad as that of CIL. If CIL is efficient in the sense of being welfare
enhancing, it might still be undesirable if there exists superior sources of norms. See Part V.A
for a discussion of such alternatives.
8. See Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487,
490 (2006); see also Ronald A. Cass, Economics and International Law, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 473, 497 (1997) (“[E]fficiency’s comparative advantage as a norm for international law
... follows from the greater diversity of situations and values encountered in the international
arena. This diversity undermines normative claims based on shared morality ... or on other
... non-utilitarian norms.”). Eyal Benvenisti goes much further, arguing that efficiency is “the
Grundnorm” of CIL, though he presents no evidence for this bold contention aside from a few
ICJ decisions that he believes adopted efficiency-promoting rules. See EYAL BENVENISTI,
develop their own rules of conduct rather than having them
legislated from above.
The extraordinary embrace of custom by international law is all
the more striking in contrast to the more cautious approach taken
by the common law, particularly tort law. The common law does not
assume that customs are normatively desirable, and thus does not
automatically bestow on them the status of binding law.5 In tort
cases, for example, customary practice does not define the level of
legal obligation; it is at best persuasive evidence which the fact-
finder can consider along with other evidence.6
This Article uses the markedly different treatment of customary
norms in international and common law as the point of departure
for examining when one can expect the customary practices of states
to develop into welfare-enhancing norms. As will be seen, customary
practices are only likely to be efficient under conditions that do not
generally obtain or obtain only weakly in the international setting.7
This calls into doubt one of the central maxims of IL—that custom-
ary international norms should be reflexively elevated to the status
of customary international law.8
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SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 204
(2002). Of course, international norms may be attractive for entirely nonconsequentialist
reasons, such as morality or fairness. These considerations are held to one side in this Article.
9. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Editorial Comment, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L. L. 385, 402 (1985) (“The rules of
international law ... were not imposed on states from on high, but rather grew out of their
interactions over centuries of practice and became established as customary international law.
Thus the rules, almost by definition, are the most efficient possible rules for avoiding
international friction and for accommodating the collective self-interest of all states.”
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Alan O. Sykes, International Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., forthcoming 2007). In contrast,
John McGinnis has argued that CIL will tend towards inefficiency because customary norms
will reflect the interests of states and their leaders, which are often antagonistic to those of
their citizens. John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and
Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 237, 242-45
(2003). The present Article approaches welfare at the level of states, rather than individuals;
thus McGinnis’s arguments are complementary to those made herein. 
D’Amato has suggested elsewhere that international customs may well be inefficient. See
ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (1971)
[hereinafter D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM] (noting that just as common law can develop
inefficient yet stable rules, “[i]nternationally, it is particularly difficult to say whether given
... rules of law are desirable or undesirable”).
10. The proposed Third Restatement of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm notes in passing
that international law adopts custom much more readily than domestic tort law. It observes
that although in international law “custom can be the actual source of legal obligations,” tort
law will only make custom obligatory if it satisfies objective criteria of reasonableness
(efficiency). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 13 cmt. a
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
11. See Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law,
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 7 (2003) (“Why is the practice of other states, no matter how widespread
and even when informed by a sense of legal obligation, law for a state that declines to follow
it?”).
International law scholars generally assume that customary
norms are efficient.9 The contrasting status of custom in interna-
tional and domestic law has scarcely been noted10 and its implica-
tions for customary international law have gone unexplored. This is
a particularly striking gap in the international law literature given
that custom plays a much larger role in IL than in private law. CIL
is like heaven: some people believe it exists, others do not, and some
take the middle view of seeing it as a metaphor. But no one doubts
that it is a good thing. Yet the literature has not sought to justify
this assumption, and thus leaves open the question of why the
customary practice of some or even most states should be law for all
states.11 
866 INEFFICIENT CUSTOMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
12. See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 nn.2-4 (1999) (providing a brief overview of this body of literature). The
literature variously refers to nonlegal norms as “social norms” and “customs.” Id. The terms
are mostly used interchangeably, though there may be some difference in meaning in
particular contexts. This Article uses the term “custom” in keeping with IL terminology, but
the term should be understood to embrace much of “social norms” as well.
13. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom
in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11 (1992) (“[J]ust because something has always been
done does not necessarily mean that it has always been done correctly. What must be shown
is that there is a strong set of incentives that leads custom to succeed.”). 
14. See infra Part III.C.1.
15. See infra Part III.C.2-3.
16. See infra Part III.C.4.
17. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
In private law, on the other hand, the relationship between law
and customary norms has received significant attention in recent
years.12 The literature has recognized that customs should not be
given the force of law unless they would tend towards efficiency.
Because customary practices, which develop over time and with no
particular author, are by definition not designed to improve
efficiency, the theory must explain why the process of their forma-
tion would result in efficient norms.13 
There is no general assumption that the customary practices are
efficient. However, the scholarship on custom points to several
conditions that support the emergence of efficient customary norms.
The group in which the norm emerges cannot be too large.14 Its
members should have a significant degree of homogeneity and
interact frequently.15 They should be known to each other. The
participants in the formation of the custom should over time find
themselves on both sides of the emerging norm;16 for example, each
should act as both buyer and seller, as both polluter and pollutee.
The paradigmatic incubator for efficient customs is a geographically
circumscribed ethnic or trade group, such as the cattle ranchers of
Shasta County, California.17 Finally, even when an efficient norm
evolves within a group, it may not be efficient as applied to outsid-
ers with whom the group interacts. To be sure, not all of these
factors need to coincide for an efficient norm to develop, nor is it
clear to what degree they must be present. This Article will explore
to what extent the factors that promote efficient custom obtain
among the nations in the world.
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18. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die,  93 GEO. L.J. 939, 953-64
(2005) (noting that international customs are a species of social norm, and thus violations of
the norm increase the likelihood of future noncompliance by decreasing group members’ belief
in the norm’s existence); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1138 n.54 (1999) (observing “that similar game
theory principles might explain the emergence of customs among individuals” as among
nations); Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 692 n.37 (2003) (“Compliance in
international law is studied in the absence of a centralized enforcement system, creating
concerns more akin to the study of compliance with social norms.”).
19. One strand of CIL literature claims that, much as social norms sometimes work by
being internalized in group members’ preferences and thus become self-enforcing,
international norms become internalized in the values of nations and their political leaders.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Special Feature, How Is International Human Rights Law
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1400-01 (1999). The “transnational legal process” theory fails to
specify the mechanism of norm internalization or to explain why interactions with
international norms will result in internalization rather than rejection, in particular when
the international norms compete or even conflict with national ones. Koh draws analogies to
small-group social norms without recognizing the differences between the global “community”
and the face-to-face community of Shasta County cattlemen that can influence the ease of
norm internalization. See id. at 1401 & n.10; infra note 154 and accompanying text.
In any case, the “transnational legal process” theory does not speak to the subject of this
Article—whether the internalized international norms will be efficient ones. Indeed,
internalization may make it less likely that CIL rules will be efficient. See infra notes 142-44
and accompanying text. 
20. For an important exception, see Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 18, at 1138 n.54
(“[C]ustoms among nations appear to be less common and more fragile than customs among
individuals. This difference is probably explained by the many differences between the factors
that influence individual behavior and those that influence international behavior.”).
21. See id. at 1114-15. Some private law scholars, in a vein parallel to the Goldsmith-
Posner critique, have suggested that commercial customs either do not arise frequently or
cannot be accurately identified in the litigation context. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The
A few words should be said about this Article’s relation to the
literature on CIL. The basic observation that international customs
are akin to social norms in the decentralized manner of their
creation and enforcement is not novel.18 The attraction of social
norms literature to IL scholars is obvious. International law’s
central weakness is a lack of centralized enforcement—there is no
power above states. Social norms literature suggests the possibility
of a robust normative system enforced by the parties themselves,
through decentralized mechanisms such as reputation and internal-
ization.19 However, most international law scholarship has ignored
the important differences between the contexts in which social
norms and CIL develop.20
Goldsmith and Posner have drawn on international relations and
game theory to argue that CIL has no force in itself.21 What
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Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 744-46 (1999).
22. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 18, at 1138-39. For example, the mere inertia of
states that have no reason to act contrary to a putative norm is taken as evidence of
compliance.
23. See, e.g., id. at 1147-51.
24. See generally Mark A. Chinen, Special Feature, Game Theory and Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143
(2001); Guzman, supra note 1; Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002).
25. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 18, at 1139 n.55; Guzman, supra note 1, at 128-
29.
international lawyers regard as binding customary norms are
merely the predictable behavioral regularities of pairs of self-
interested states.22 It is the incentives faced by states, rather than
exogenous norms, that guide their behavior. As a result, states’
behaviors will change when incentives change.23 In this model, the
behavioral regularities of each pair of interacting states are
independent of each other, and thus do not combine to form a
general custom. In response to Goldsmith and Posner’s critique,
several scholars have themselves turned to game theory to show
that genuine multilateral international customs can arise under
certain circumstances.24 Customary international norms, however,
only recommend themselves as sources of legal obligation if they are
normatively attractive. So merely showing that international
custom exists does not offer any reason for following it. Similarly,
showing that customs could be efficient under certain circumstances
does not give reason to think that CIL is efficient unless the
circumstances correspond to those in the world.
This Article assumes that customary international norms exist
and can be identified in a principled manner—thus holding to one
side the issues raised by Goldsmith and Posner. This focuses
attention on whether these behavioral regularities will be welfare
maximizing—a question Goldsmith and Posner do not address.25 
This Article concludes that, based on the account of customary
efficiency developed in the social norms literature, CIL reaches far
beyond its optimal scope. The universal ambit of CIL—looking for
custom on the highest level of geographic and subject-matter
generality—is misaligned with the likely scope of efficient norms.
This is not to say efficiency and CIL are inconsistent. But the
private law account of norms shows that their efficiency is context
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26. It is unclear whether theories of customary efficiency predict that custom will improve
group welfare relative to the situation that obtained before the creation of the custom, or
whether it would maximize group welfare, that is, outperform all other potential norms. The
implications of these different conceptions for international custom are discussed infra Part
V.A.
27. Dictatorships often benefit from increased trade because they have more resources to
expropriate and invest in defending the regime, but trade may also benefit the population.
Past some point, the growing self-reliance of the people could outweigh the increased benefits
to the regime. At the other extreme, the North Korean regime seems to have adopted a pure
strategy of national impoverishment. See PAUL FRENCH, NORTH KOREA: THE PARANOID
PENINSULA—A MODERN HISTORY 73-74 (2005).
28. For such a discussion, see Posner, supra note 8.
specific. Some norms may be efficient, some may not; the circum-
stances under which they arise are crucial. Yet CIL, as currently
understood, does not make such distinctions. This Article suggests
that efforts to identify and establish CIL should focus on the
scenarios where custom is most likely to be efficient. Instead of a
global, monolithic, customary international law, it makes sense to
recognize an array of more local, limited customs—multiple
customary international law regimes rather than a unified Custom-
ary International Law. 
Before proceeding, some basic assumptions should be spelled out.
First, this Article treats rational, self-interested, Westphalian states
as the relevant actors in customary international law. An efficient
custom is one that improves the joint welfare of all the states in the
world.26 Although states are presumed to be self-interested, this
simply means they seek to maximize an objective function; it does
not specify the objective function itself. States are too heterogeneous
to say much more than that, like people, they prefer to have more
wealth rather than less, and to continue to exist. The welfare of
their nationals will be a term in states’ objective function, but the
function is not always increasing in it.27
Examining the welfare effects of norms from the perspective of
states/regimes raises the question of whether states can be said to
have welfare, or whether the state is merely a “veil” behind which
are people, and it is their welfare that matters.28 First, states
behave as if they have interests and welfare. Thus it is a standard
convention of rational choice analysis of international law, which
considers interactions between states, to consider only the welfare
870 INEFFICIENT CUSTOMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
29. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 GEO.
L. J. 993, 1001-02 (2005); see also Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 18.
30. See McGinnis, supra note 9, at 242-45. McGinnis treats states as agents of their
populace, and the goal of international legal rules as maximizing the aggregate welfare of the
world’s population. Id. at 237-38.
31. In one important way, individual welfare is improved by norms that are efficient from
the states’ perspective. Because interstate conflicts are fought by the nationals of states, they
are disastrous for individual welfare. Using state welfare as a normative criterion should
reduce interstate conflict, which will benefit individuals. See supra note 9. Conversely, if a
norm is inefficient from a state-centered perspective, but nonetheless represents a stable
equilibrium, it can prevent the welfare losses of international conflict that could arise in a
transition to a better norm. That is, given the cost of conflict, a bad norm may be better than
no norm, and may even be better than a more efficient norm once transaction costs (in the
form of war) are taken into account. See infra note 211 (discussing coordination games).
32. See supra note 7.
of the states themselves.29 This is not surprising given that states
are the actors whose behavior is being modeled. 
Second, whatever the artificiality of treating states as having
welfare, their observed behavior suggests it is superior to the
alternative—treating aggregate human welfare as the goal of
international law.  In principle, states and their governing regimes
might act either as agents for their states’ populations, or as
principals. Even if regimes were agents for their populations, the
difficulty of the populations’ monitoring and controlling the states’
participation in custom formation would make the state a highly
imperfect agent.30 The degree of imperfection is such that one would
be justified in treating the regime, for purposes of analysis, as
principals rather than agents. In any case, in their domestic conduct
many states do not seek to maximize the welfare of their popula-
tions, and sometimes they purposefully undermine it. States that
are only occasionally interested in promoting their own populations’
welfare would not likely seek, in their mutual dealings, to maximize
the welfare of the world’s population.
Even if a norm improves the welfare of states, it may leave most
people worse off. Conversely, what this Article calls “inefficient
norms” could improve aggregate individual welfare.31 So it bears
repeating that the efficiency of norms from the perspective of states
is not the only relevant criterion for assessing the normative
desirability of international custom.32
In any case, the circumstances under which international custom
is created make it unlikely to advance whatever goals states as a
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33. Robert Cooter describes this mode of analysis as “[t]he structural approach,” which
infers efficiency or inefficiency from “the incentive structures” that produce the norm, rather
than attempting to directly measure the norm’s costs and benefits. See Robert D. Cooter,
Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 215, 226-27 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, A Transaction Cost Analysis of Universal Jurisdiction,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that universal jurisdiction prevents efficient
resolution of international criminal cases by preventing implicit or explicit settlements,
because settlement with one potential forum does not preclude future prosecution by another);
Posner & Sykes, supra note 29 (using economic models to show that norms against
preemptive attack and humanitarian intervention are suboptimal).
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See Cooter, supra note 33, at 226-27.
group seek. Those features of the international system that make
state-efficient customs unlikely to emerge make it unlikely, a
fortiori, that customs will be efficient in the more ambitious sense
of individuals’ welfare, because of the additional assumptions
individual welfarism makes about states as agents for their
populations. 
It should also be stressed that this Article does not evaluate the
efficiency of particular customs themselves, but rather deduces it
from the conditions under which they develop.33 Aside from limiting
the scope of the project—a comprehensive normative assessment of
a single norm is an endeavor in its own right34—there are two
justifications for keeping the analysis to the general level. 
The first goes to why customary norms may be attractive in the
first place. The attraction of custom as a source of law lies in its
ability to aggregate information about costs and benefits not visible
to individual observers.35 Custom synthesizes wisdom across space
and time in a way that is difficult for individuals to match. Custom-
ary international practices involve complex institutions and
multiple actors over long time periods. They are likely to have many
ramifications, positive and negative, all of which bear on their
efficiency. Many effects will not be observable or readily attributed
to the custom.36 Thus merely telling plausible stories about why
some customary practices are or are not efficient smacks of ad
hockery. Second, the evaluation of particular customs is somewhat
incidental to the central exploration of this Article, which is whether
CIL as a whole has a claim to normative desirability of the kind
made by other customary regimes. Identifying particular inefficient
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37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
38. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
customs would not prove this Article’s thesis, nor would finding
efficient ones refute it.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I compares the status of
custom in international law and common law. It shows that private
law takes a much more cautious approach to the legalization of
custom than IL does. Part II explores the social norms literature on
whether customs can be expected to improve efficiency. Although
there is no consensus here, there is agreement about the factors that
would make the emergence of efficient customs more likely. Part III
goes on to consider whether these factors obtain in the international
context, which allows for a rough estimate of whether CIL norms
are likely to be efficient. Part IV applies these insights to specific
doctrinal questions and controversies in CIL. Most significantly, it
argues that CIL exceeds the possible contours of customary
efficiency by giving customs global application. Part V shows how
the ability of customary norms to enhance welfare will vary greatly
across areas of law. The legalization of customary norms, therefore,
should depend on whether those customs arise in a context condu-
cive to efficiency. The point is illustrated with two polar examples:
diplomatic immunity and laws relating to war. 
I. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL AND PRIVATE LAW
This Part contrasts the differing positions toward custom taken
by international and common law. In IL, when a custom exists
among a significant number of states, it becomes law for all states.37
In private law, on the other hand, courts do not assume that a
custom should be given the force of law without some independent
evidence that it is efficient.38 Thus the judge or jury must make an
independent determination as to whether the custom satisfies
normative criteria. In international law, by contrast, there is no
filter between customary and legal obligation. To find a customary
international norm is to find a customary international law.
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39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
40. Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA.
J. INT’L L. 365, 372-73 (2002).
41. See D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 9, at 4.
42. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 1, at 148-49.
43. See COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, INT’L LAW ASS’N,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/CustomaryLaw.pdf.
44. See, e.g., D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 9, at 66.
A. International Law
1. Defining CIL
Customary international law arises “from a general and consis-
tent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”39 The standard definition has two elements: state
practice, and sense of legal obligation (opinio juris neccesitatas). The
former is an objective element, consisting of observable acts or
omissions; the second is subjective—a “mental” state, most often
proven through diplomatic statements and declarations.40 State
practice defines the substantive contours of the norm. Opinio juris
distinguishes mere behavioral regularities, such as calling ambassa-
dors “your Excellency,” from binding norms, such as giving ambas-
sadors immunity from legal processes. 
Every aspect of Customs’ definition has long been plagued by
deep disagreement. The process by which customs emerge remains
mysterious.41 There is considerable confusion over what kind of acts
count as “practice”; whether omissions count; for how long the
practice must continue; how many nations must participate in the
practice for it to be general; how easily contrary practice defeats the
requirement of “consistency”; and whether state practice is required
at all.42 
The subjective element raises as many questions. Does the opinio
juris need to be contemporaneous with the practice? What consti-
tutes evidence of opinio juris, particularly when a state has
numerous officials who might express different views on the legality
of an action? Some authorities argue that opinio juris is not
required at all.43 Most famously, the opinio juris requirement has
been criticized for its “circularity.”44 Regular practice “ripens” into
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45. See id.
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. b (1987) (“A practice can be general even if it is not universally followed; there is no
precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be ....”); D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF
CUSTOM, supra note 9, at 58; Guzman, supra note 1, at 124-25.
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. b.
48. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt.
d (1987) (“[C]ustomary law may be built by the acquiescence as well as by the actions of states
... and become generally binding on all states ....”).
50. Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56 A.F.
L. REV. 1, 56 (2005).
51. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 37-38 (1995); Jonathan
I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 538-39 (1993).
binding CIL when done with the belief that it is legally required.
But the behavior is not required until it has ripened—until it has
been done repeatedly out of a sense of legal obligation.45 Thus, a
state’s belief that a course of conduct is obligatory must come before
the behavior truly becomes obligatory. This would mean CIL
depends on states being mistaken about their legal duties.  
2. Universal Scope
Despite this confusion, several broad points are clear. Custom
arises from the practice of numerous states, but not all states need
to participate in a custom for it to become law.46 The custom need
not even be joined by all states in a position to do so.47 The pattern
of state practice need not be uninterrupted.48 Furthermore, the vocal
opposition of some states does not prevent a customary practice
from becoming law. 
Once a custom becomes CIL, it is law for all states, even those
that did not participate in its formation.49 CIL also applies to
states that were unaware of the customary practice, and even those
that openly disapproved.50 Indeed, a CIL norm binds even states
that came into existence after the custom was established.51
Furthermore, once a custom becomes CIL it cannot be “repealed”
except by contrary state practice, yet the first instances of such state
practice would themselves be illegal. 
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52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. d (1987).
53. See, e.g., David Sloss, Do International Norms Influence State Behavior?, 38 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 159, 173-74 & n.81 (2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A.
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54. Charney, supra note 51, at 538-39.
55. See id. at 538.
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. k (1987).
57. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 204-05 & n.129 (2004).
58. See, e.g., D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 9, at 234; Guzman, supra note 1,
at 153.
59. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
CIL does provide a narrow escape hatch for nations who oppose
an emerging custom. The “persistent objector” exception exempts
from a CIL norm nations who, in the period before the custom
“matures” into law, repeatedly and vocally made their opposition
known.52 The “persistence” required of the objector is quite substan-
tial, and there is a tendency to aggressively construe a failure to
raise objections at a particular moment as a waiver, despite
previous and subsequent objections.53 Moreover, states that come
into existence after the creation of the norm cannot become
persistent objectors.54 Similarly, a state would be bound if it failed
to object simply because it was not engaged in the relevant area of
activity when the custom developed.55
Some international lawyers advocate even further broadening the
legal effect of international customs. The doctrine of jus cogens holds
that certain humanitarian norms, like the prohibition of genocide
and war crimes, cannot be trumped by subsequent custom.56 Unlike
other customary norms, jus cogens norms cannot be contracted
around by treaty. It is unclear what customary norms count as jus
cogens or how they acquire that status. The general idea seems to
be that prohibitions of morally egregious conduct are jus cogens.57
To summarize, the key move of CIL is to transform the custom of
some states into law for all states, even those that have not
participated in or consented to the customary practice. CIL has no
minor leagues; its presumptive scope is the entire world.58 A
customary practice is either nonlegal, in which case it binds no one,
or legal, in which case it binds all current and future states
(persistent objectors aside).59
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60. See Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 1960 WL 2,
at *40 (Apr. 12). In the two-state scenario, special custom comes to resemble course of dealing
in contract law, or prescription in property law. See U.C.C. § 1-303(b) (2001); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.16-.17 (2000).
61. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 1950 WL 10, at **277-78 (Nov. 20).
62. See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
627, 709 (2001) (“Special custom remains ... a controversial method for analyzing
international law.”).
63. See, for example, BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER:
A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK (3d ed. 1997), in which neither the table of contents nor
the index mention special customs.
64. See D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 9, at 263 (noting that “the examples
[of a court giving recognition to a special custom] are too few to spell out all the elements of
special custom in international law,” and suggesting that there may not be any definite
doctrine of special custom at all).
65. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 1969 WL 1, at **130-
31 (Feb. 20) (Ammoun, J., concurring) (“[W]hile a general rule of customary law does not
require the consent of all States, ... it is not the same with a regional customary rule ....”
(footnote omitted)). 
66. D’AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 9, at 234; KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN
3. Special Custom
International law has infrequently admitted the possibility of
“special” or “local” customs arising and taking on legal force. A
“special custom” is created through repeated dealings of a smaller
group of states than would be required to create a general
custom—perhaps as few as two.60 More importantly, when a special
custom takes on the status of CIL, it is only binding on the specific
states that participated in its formation.61 In other words, special
custom is opt-in, whereas general custom is opt-out. 
The special custom doctrine has been the neglected stepchild of
CIL.62 International law textbooks devote only a few pages to special
custom.63 Indeed, legal recognition of special custom exists more in
theory than in practice. Discussions of special custom are confined
to four International Court of Justice cases decided in the 1950s and
60s, not all of which explicitly invoked the concept.64 
What little writing there is on special custom takes a dim view of
it. A leading case suggests that it is harder to enforce a special
custom against a defendant state than it is to enforce a general
custom.65 Scholars have argued that special custom should only
become legally cognizable with clearer demonstrations of opinio
juris and state practice than would be required for general custom.66
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PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (2d rev. ed. 1993).
67. See Swaine, supra note 62, at 710. 
68. Recently some scholars have argued for a greater receptivity to local custom. See
Guzman, supra note 1, at 161 (“[I]t is neither necessary nor desirable to increase the showing
required to find opinio juris in special custom. In a world of heterogeneous states, there is
reason to think special custom will play an important role in the relations among them.”);
Swaine, supra note 62, at 709-10 (arguing that special custom allows diverse interests to be
accommodated, and counters the antidemocratic tendency of general CIL).
69. See, e.g., infra note 76 and accompanying text.
70. See Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for International Sales,
39 VA. J. INT’L L. 707, 707-10 (1999).
This is puzzling in contrast to the treatment of general custom; in
the latter, dozens of nations that did not participate in a norm’s
formation can be bound without their consent. In special custom,
however, international law will not bind even a single nation
without the clearest evidence of its consent.
The emphasis on general custom over special custom may be
motivated by an assumption that the larger the number of nations
participating in a customary practice, the more likely it is to be
desirable as a binding norm. Or it may relate to programmatic
concerns about special custom inhibiting the formation of broader
rules,67 which is itself troubling only under the cosmopolitan
assumption that global rules are more normatively attractive than
a collection of local rules.68 Or it may just be that since treaties and
customs are substitutes, and the costs of negotiating among a small
group are much lower, much of what would be done by special
custom will be done by treaties. 
B. Private Law
Custom finds a much cooler reception in private law. The general
rule is that customary practices do not automatically receive legal
backing. Courts recognize that inefficient customs can arise and
persist.69 The significant exception to this pattern is the law of sales,
where statutory reforms have supplanted the traditional suspicion
to custom.70
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71. See, e.g., Stone v. Crown Diversified Indus. Corp., 9 S.W.3d 659, 670 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999) (“‘[C]ustoms and usage evidence does not set the legal standard of care.’ In fact, even
if such evidence of custom and practice is unchallenged, a court may disregard it and find the
custom fails to require conduct that rises to the level of ordinary care.” (quoting Inst. of
London Underwriters v. Eagle Boats, Ltd., 918 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D. Mo. 1996))); Wanner
v. Getter Trucking, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 833, 837 n.4 (N.D. 1991); Abram & Tracy, Inc. v. Smith,
623 N.E.2d 704, 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“Evidence of industry custom does not conclusively
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evidence ....”); see also Epstein, supra note 13, at 1-3 (observing that the long-dominant view
in tort law is that custom plays only a “subordinate role” in establishing the standard of care).
72. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 13 cmt. b (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (noting that “there is no minority rule”).
74. Epstein, supra note 13, at 25 (“By far the largest group of nineteenth-century cases
adhere to the line that was articulated with such eloquence by Learned Hand: that custom
is only evidence of the role of due care.”).
75. Id. 
76. 60 F.2d at 740.
77. Id. at 737.
78. Id. at 739.
1. Tort
A group’s custom does not establish its members’ legal obligation
in tort.71 Instead, the efficiency (“reasonableness”) standard governs
whether due care has been taken.72 Although custom may be looked
to as evidence of cost-justified measures, the fact-finder may reject
it. This cautious approach to custom is both universally accepted73
and longstanding.74 A few nineteenth century cases reflect a knee-
jerk adoption of custom akin to that found in CIL, but such cases
were unusual then75 and even more so since Judge Learned Hand’s
famous criticism of such an approach in The T.J. Hooper: 
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the
general practice of the [industry] the standard of proper dili-
gence .... [A] whole [industry] may have unduly lagged in the
adoption of new and available [safety] devices. It never may set
its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in
the end say what is required ....76 
  
The T.J. Hooper, a tug towing barges along the Atlantic coast, lost
its cargo in a storm.77 Had the tug been equipped with a radio, it
would have known of the storm and avoided it.78 In a suit by the
barge and cargo owners, the tugboat owner claimed that it was not
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80. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740.
81. ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Minn. 1996)
(“[T]he evidence of industry custom ... did not establish a [legal] duty ....”); Fellers v. St. Louis-
S.F. Ry. Co., 572 P.2d 972, 977 (Okla. 1977) (Simms, J., dissenting) (“[Custom] does not
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usual procedure or custom was the equivalent of negligence ‘per se.’”); Lovins v. Jackson, 378
P.2d 727, 731 (Or. 1963) (en banc) (“[V]iolation of a general custom or usage was some
evidence of negligence, and not negligence per se.”).
82. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 13
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. c (1965);
see also Am. Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Wusich, 375 P.2d 364, 367 (Ariz. 1962) (en banc) (“A
custom may exact more or less than the demands of due care ....”); Elmer v. Mut. S.S. Co., 130
N.W. 1104, 1106 (Minn. 1911) (“Evidence of custom in negligence cases is admitted, not on the
theory that a breach of custom is negligence per se, or observance of custom necessarily
conclusive that there was no negligence.”).
83. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millenium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 163 (2000) (“While defendants in ordinary tort
actions are expected to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, physicians
traditionally have needed only to conform to the customs of their peers.”).
84. Id. at 166 n.15.
85. Id. at 170 (observing that by 1999 twelve states “expressly refused to be bound by
medical customs” and another nine states had moved in that direction, suggesting a “steady
pattern of defections from the custom-based standard of care” in the future).
the custom of the industry for owners to equip their vessels with
receivers.79 Judge Hand held that, despite the custom of sailing
without a receiver, the law required ships to have one.80
Just as a defendant’s compliance with customary norms does not
insulate him from liability, failure to conform to custom does not
establish it.81 Thus custom is neither the ceiling nor the floor for
standard of care.82 Medical custom has long been the exception to
the rule, with the profession’s customary procedures providing the
standard of care in malpractice cases.83 Here courts attempt to cast
the custom as narrowly as possible, looking to the standard of care
for the relevant specialty rather than that for a general practitioner,
when at one time the defendant’s standard of care was dictated
specifically by the custom of his locality.84 However, the medical
custom exception may be eroding.85 
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86. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 9-10 (describing custom as an information-economizing
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news as “quasi property”). See generally Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v.
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88. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
89. Id. at 175.
90. Id.
91. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1231
(1979).
92. See Dhammika Dharmapala & Rohan Pitchford, An Economic Analysis of “Riding to
Hounds”: Pierson v. Post Revisited,  18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 39, 45 (2002) (“[T]he majority’s
holding directly contradicted the relevant social custom.”).
93. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 181-82 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
94. Dharmapala & Pitchford, supra note 92, at 45-46.
2. Property
Custom plays a relatively small role in property law because most
property rights are clearly assigned and the rules for their transfer
well known. Custom is valuable in part because of information
constraints: in torts, the uncertainty inherent in accidents, when
victim and tortfeasor do not know one another in advance; and in
contracts, the parties’ inability to contract as to every possible
eventuality.86 Thus property law seems to confront custom most
often in cases of capture of fugitive resources and new types of
property.87
In the textbook case on the first-possession rule, Pierson v. Post,88
a court disregarded the unchallenged community custom in order to
lay down a more efficient norm. Pierson involved a dispute over a
fox between two Long Island gentlemen-hunters. Post organized a
fox hunt, during which he managed to give chase to a fox.89 Along
came Pierson, who shot the fox that Post pursued.90 The unambigu-
ous custom among hunters in the area was that a rider in pursuit
had superior title against the world.91 The court, however, decided
the fox should go to whoever killed it.92 Justice Livingston, in
dissent, argued for custom.93
A recent analysis suggests the custom could indeed have been
inefficient, a means of excluding interlopers from the high-society
sport of riding to hounds.94 Huntsmen, who gave rise to the custom,
were not the only ones with an interest in killing foxes. Farmers
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100. 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881).
wanted them dead too, and both the majority and the dissent
conceded that the optimal rule would be the one that resulted in the
most pest eradication.95 Yet hunters had mixed motives, such as the
enjoyment of riding to hounds in the company of one’s peers,
uninterrupted by the hoi polloi; and the prestige of personally killing
a fox, which is different from the group killing the most foxes.96 Thus
hunters would prefer a rule that results in less net fox killing, as it
would maximize their recreational pleasure. The hunters’ custom
could be inefficient when the interests of both hunters and farmers
are considered.97
Pierson teaches several lessons about the dangers of legalizing
custom. First, heterogeneity—here, a society composed of farmers
and hunters—is the enemy of efficient custom. Second, a custom can
be inefficient even when the heterogeneity is not antagonistic in
nature. That is, both farmers and hunters had a common interest in
killing foxes. But the differences in the intensity of their preferences
could be enough to make the customs of one group suboptimal when
the interests of all are taken into account. Third, reciprocity of roles
is crucial: the hunters’ custom, not surprisingly, would not reflect
the farmers’ interest because class differences ensured that farmers
would never hunt.98 Customs that at first glance seem efficient may
create subtle externalities that escape notice in a case where one
member of a close-knit group seeks to enforce a custom against
another. In such a context, an outside observer might not even
imagine the nature of the externalities and on whom they fall.99 
Another classic case takes a more favorable approach to custom.
Ghen v. Rich100 is particularly notable in that custom triumphed
despite the heterogeneity of the relevant community. Certain types
of Massachusetts whalers killed their prey and let it wash ashore,
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101. Id. at 159-60.
102. See id. at 160.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 162.
106. Id. (holding that the custom’s “application must necessarily be extremely limited, and
can affect but a few persons”).
107. See id.
108. Id. For confirmation of this point from a modern scholar, see Robert C. Ellickson, A
Hypothesis of Wealth-maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 83, 93 (1989).
109. See Ghen, 8 F. at 162.
110. Id.
111. Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 560 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696) (observing that
custom applied only to the tiny community of New England Arctic whalers, and that “[i]n this
a process that took several days.101 According to local custom, the
whaler owned the whale from the moment he killed it.102 When it
would be subsequently found by beachcombers they would not keep
it, but rather return it to the whaler for a salvage fee.103 In Ghen,
the whale washed up seventeen miles from where it was killed, and
the finder decided to keep it for himself.104 The finder was held
liable for violating the custom.105 
The heterogeneity among community members was apparent, and
presumably the two roles would never be flipped. The court did
stress the small size of the relevant community, even suggesting
that it would not trust custom that bound a larger group,106 and also
alluded to a high frequency of interactions.107 Apparently both
groups participated in the formation of the custom
Note that in Ghen the court did not reflexively adopt the custom
as the legally enforceable norm. Instead, the court made clear that
it applied the customary rule only because it was satisfied that
doing so was socially optimal.108 The court worked through the
incentive effects of the rule: given the characteristics of the animal
in question, any other method of recovery was impractical, and thus
not giving title to the whaler would eliminate the industry alto-
gether.109 Indeed, the court claimed that the customary origin of the
norm may have been entirely incidental to the court’s adoption of it:
“It is by no means clear that without regard to usage the common
law would not reach the same result.”110 Similarly, in a case Ghen
relied on, the custom of whalers on the same issue as Pierson v. Post
was decided in favor of the customary rule.111 The court was careful
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case the parties all understood the custom” and had agreed to it).
112. Id. at 559-60.
113. U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2001) (“A ... usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which [the
parties] are engaged or of which they are or should be aware is relevant in ascertaining the
meaning of the parties’ agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the
agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.”). “Usage of trade”
is the Code’s term for custom. Id. § 1-303 cmts. 4-5. The UCC’s incorporation of commercial
norms has recently drawn considerable criticism, especially from norms-focused scholars. See,
e.g., Bernstein, supra note 21, at 779-80. 
114. U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 4 (2001) (“[F]ull recognition is thus available for new usages and
for usages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents
ready to cut corners do not agree.”).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 cmt. c (1981).
116. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2001) (“A ‘usage of trade’ is any practice or method of dealing having
... regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade ....” (emphasis added)).
to note, however, that there would be many circumstances in which
the custom would not be upheld because it would not be
reasonable.112 
Thus, both Pierson and Ghen suggest courts will consider
customary property norms as providing evidence of a possible
efficient equilibrium. However, that something is a custom does not
automatically make it legally enforceable, as it may be inefficient.
3. Contract
Modern commercial law comes closest to international law’s
uncritical legalization of custom. Under article 1 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), parties are bound not just by the written
terms of their agreement, but also by relevant industry custom.113
Thus the UCC makes custom legally binding, even on those
members of the industry who dissented from the emerging norm.114
Although the custom generally will be applied only against members
of the same industry, it could potentially bind outsiders who deal
with an industry member and “know or have reason to know of [the
practice].”115 Nonetheless, the custom to which the UCC looks has
more the flavor of “special” than “general” custom—the group
among which the custom arose should be geographically or profes-
sionally circumscribed.116 Contract law’s warmer attitude towards
custom may make sense on efficiency grounds. Unlike in tort and
property law, commercial contracting customs emerge in market
conditions. If markets lead to efficient resource allocations, they
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117. See supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
118. See U.C.C. § 1-303(c) cmt. 5 (2001) (“The very fact of commercial acceptance makes out
a prima facie case that the usage is reasonable, and the burden is no longer on the usage to
establish itself as being reasonable.”). The UCC departs significantly from the earlier common
law of contracts in this regard. Id.; see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES **74-77
(explaining that “[w]hen a custom is actually proved to exist, the next enquiry [sic] is into the
legality of it; for if it is not a good custom it ought to be no longer used”).
119. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. And like jus cogens, the filter-doctrines
are vague enough that they can be misused by courts to arrive at particular results.
120. U.C.C. § 1-303(e)(1) (2001) (“[E]xpress terms prevail over ... usage of trade.”).
121. See WOLFKE, supra note 66, at 143 (“The recurring provisions in numerous treaties
do not of themselves constitute sufficient evidence of customary rules binding other states.
Such treaties, on the contrary, may often express exceptions to general customary law.”
(footnote omitted)).
122. See id. at 141-43 (discussing courts’ use of treaties as evidence of parties’ acceptance
of CIL).
must also generate efficient customs, much like the whalers and
beachcombers.117
The UCC presumes mercantile customs to be efficient; courts
under the UCC do not conduct independent inquiries into the
desirability of commercial practices.118 The UCC explicitly assumes
that the processes through which industry custom is formed vouch
for their desirability. As with jus cogens,119 the doctrines of
unconscionability and bad faith are intended to serve as an
extraordinary filter to catch the rare custom that is grossly ineffi-
cient. Unconscionability aside, parties can opt out of the customary
norms through explicit contractual provisions.120
Of course, custom will only be looked at when a contractual
relationship already exists. This significantly limits its scope—
custom is used as a gap filler to written contracts; it would be
unusual for a custom to create a contractual obligation in the
absence of an explicit agreement. This distinguishes it from much
of CIL, which does not require or even presume any treaty relation-
ship between the disputing states.121 However, CIL is sometimes
called on to serve a gap-filling function in treaty interpretation.122
This use of CIL is most analogous to the UCC’s approach to usage
of trade.
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123. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social
Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027, 2030 (2001).
124. Id. (characterizing the dominant view of social norms scholars about the efficiency of
norms “as guarded optimism” with “a few pessimistic notes”).
125. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
167-63 (1991); 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 85-89 (1973); WILLIAM M. LANDES
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 132 (1987); Cooter, supra note
33, at 226; Epstein, supra note 87, at 85-86; Epstein, supra note 13, at 10.
126. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 130-47 (1989)
(giving examples of inefficient norms and explaining reasons customs may be inefficient); ERIC
A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 169-79 (2000) (“Functionalism—the view that social
practices and norms are efficient or adaptive in some way—is empirically false and
methodologically sterile.”); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous
World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 78-79 (1999); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of
Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 407-08 (1997) (using a cultural evolution theory
to argue that customary practices are unlikely to be efficient); Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra
note 123, at 2048-54 (using games to demonstrate inefficiency in property, tort, and contract
norms).
127. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 87, at 87.
128. Compare Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 123, with Randal C. Picker, Simple
II. THE POTENTIAL EFFICIENCY OF CUSTOMS
The role of nonlegal norms in regulating behavior and the
interaction of these norms with positive law has become a signifi-
cant field of interest for legal scholars. A major theme of this
literature is whether social norms tend towards efficiency, or at
least are better regulators than deliberate ordering by legislatures
and courts.123 The question is far from being resolved.124 Much
influential writing reflects the view that customs outperform other
modes of regulation.125 More recent literature, however, has
demonstrated how customary norms can be inefficient.126
Some broad lines of agreement can be discerned. Skeptics do not
argue that customs cannot be efficient, but rather that they are not
particularly likely to be. More importantly, even those most
optimistic about custom acknowledge that it will only be efficient
within certain parameters.127 Generalizing the scholarly positions
in terms of “custom skeptics” and “custom enthusiasts” will be
convenient.
This Article does not attempt to resolve any questions about
whether customary practices are generally efficient. Both skeptics
and optimists have produced game-theoretic models demonstrating
the possible evolution of inefficient and efficient norms,128 and one
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Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1225, 1227 (1997) (using game theory to show efficiency in self-organized groups with
“shared values about norms”).
129. See ELLICKSON, supra note 125, at 167-83.
130. See ELSTER, supra note 126, at 286; POSNER, supra note 126, at 172-77.
131. See 1 F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 37 (W.W. Bartley
III ed., 1988).
132. Cooter describes group members “as hosts for competing behaviors.” Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New
Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1660 (1996).
can point to examples of well-established efficient norms,129 as well
as ones that are inefficient.130 
Even relatively optimistic assumptions about the efficiency of
custom have significant cautionary implications for current CIL
doctrine. To the extent this optimistic view overstates the case for
custom, the implications for CIL are even more dramatic, as will be
briefly shown.
A. Custom Optimism
No account of custom specifies precisely how customs emerge and
develop. Hayek, a leading champion of custom, spoke of a “sponta-
neous order[ing],”131 though he clearly did not mean spontaneous in
the sense of instantaneous. Rather, custom emerges through the
noncoordinated interactions of group members, each seeking to
advance their interest. It has no clear starting point. It is incremen-
tal but also prone to cascades.
Optimistic accounts of custom generally rely on evolutionary
stories in which, over time and multiple interactions, welfare-
maximizing norms beat out inferior ones. In the beginning, an issue
exists that must be resolved one way or another. A series of
interactions between group members allows for testing of various
possible behaviors.132 Indeed, the behaviors are not chosen from a
menu, but may be invented by the parties based on their view of the
best way to deal with a situation—or they may even be randomly
chosen. Because behaviors are chosen in the context of a consensual
interaction between members, self-serving or opportunistic behavior
will be rejected by one party or the other. What will be left is a
range of behaviors that might plausibly increase joint welfare. 
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136. See id. at 12.
137. See ELSTER, supra note 126, at 130-35; POSNER, supra note 126, at 176 (“[O]ne can
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Of these, the behaviors that most increase the joint surplus of the
parties to an interaction will be chosen more often than those that
do not. The group members’ choice of behavior need not be purpose-
ful so long as a selection mechanism exists. In commercial settings,
the competitive market serves as such a mechanism. Surpluses can
be shared with customers, and thus group members who choose
inefficient norms will fail.133 Thus, in a commercial setting equilib-
rium customs will be efficient—even when applied to outsiders who
have a business relationship with the group members.134 An
inefficient custom would in effect mean that the industry refused to
sell customers something they wanted—a better custom. 
Hayek’s laudatory account of custom suggests that it, like the
price mechanism, economizes on information and thus produces
results superior to legislation.135 His account is also an evolutionary
one, but it stresses that the individual group members cumulatively
possess more information about the circumstances in which the
custom would operate than any legislator could.136 Custom is a tool
for aggregating this knowledge. When group members select among
competing behaviors, the selection is not a random choice but one
informed by this local knowledge. Group members can also draw on
their private information to modify or reject a developing customary
behavior. The custom that emerges from these repeated interactions
reflects the information available to all that participated in its
formation. Hayek’s account is particularly relevant to international
law because it applies beyond the commercial context, that is, to
areas where competitive forces do not provide a selection mecha-
nism.
B. Custom Pessimism
Customs can go bad. If they are not more likely to promote
efficiency than to retard it, they should not be given deference.137
First, it will be useful to specify what is meant by an inefficient
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138. ELSTER, supra note 126, at 114-16 (discussing medical triage practices); POSNER, supra
note 126, at 169-71 (discussing the giving of unwanted gifts).
139. See Cooter, supra note 132, at 1687-88 (discussing “nonconvexity”); Mahoney &
Sanchirico, supra note 123, at 2048-51 (discussing “‘endogenous interaction,’ under which
evolution will select for the efficient strategy even when that strategy’s mismatch risk
outweighs its efficiency advantage”).
140. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 171; Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating
and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 378-
79 (1999).
141. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 173-74, 176; Kraus, supra note 126, at 407-08.
142. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 43-44.
143. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 140, at 373-74.
144. See id. at 370; Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach,
87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 367 (1997).
custom. The weak form of the inefficiency argument is that custom
will not improve group welfare by as much as norms produced by an
alternative institution, such as a court. In a stronger form of the
argument, a social norm may be entirely dysfunctional, reducing
group welfare relative to a situation in which there is no norm.
Simply removing the norm would increase welfare even if it is not
replaced by an alternative.138 Consider some reasons custom may be
inefficient.
First, customs are path-dependent. Because custom proceeds in
an incremental fashion, a step that is a marginal improvement may
actually preclude much more significant future improvements by
leading customary development into a dead end.139 Second, customs
develop slowly, which is a problem when circumstances change
quickly. Customs that were welfare maximizing at one point in time
may persist after changed circumstances render them suboptimal
or even welfare diminishing.140 Third, once a custom is in place,
defection from it may be more costly for each group member than
bearing the cost of inefficiency would.141 
Moreover, custom sometimes works through norm internaliza-
tion.142 Norm internalization, by making compliance self-enforcing
on the individual level through feelings of guilt, makes efficient
breach less likely.143 For the individual who internalizes norms,
compliance no longer turns on a comparison of the marginal benefits
of violation to the marginal cost of punishment, but rather becomes
an end in itself. Thus the instrumental purpose of the norm becomes
lost.144
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145. When group members have contractual relationships with the outsiders, externalizing
costs is harder because they can be priced into the contracts.
146. See Bernstein, supra note 21, at 714 & n.14. 
147. See infra Part II.C.1.
148. See infra Part II.C.2.
149. See infra Part II.C.3.
150. See infra Part II.C.4.
The simplest reason for an inefficient custom is when group
members improve their welfare by externalizing costs onto outsid-
ers.145 Public choice might suggest that such customs would be the
most common. Customs regulating output among producers may
enhance their welfare at the expense of consumers. Here customs
are substitutes for express anticompetitive planning. The benefits
of custom are perverse here; the diffuse information that custom
allows to be drawn together in such a case is information about the
equilibrium production quota. In such cases custom makes cartels
more effective and thus reduces social welfare.  
C. Factors Promoting Efficient Custom
Custom optimists and skeptics differ on the general question of
whether custom is likely to be efficient compared to other methods
of regulation. Underneath these differing views, one finds consider-
able agreement about the conditions that facilitate the emergence
of efficient custom.146 Even custom optimists do not think any norms
emerging from any social context will be efficient, nor do pessimists
rule out the possibility that certain confluence of factors could give
rise to efficient norms. Efficient social norms will most likely
develop under the following circumstances, which will be explained
in more detail below: 
(a) small group size;147 
(b) frequent interactions between group members148
(c) who are homogenous along some important dimen-
sion (such as religion, ethnicity, or scope of opera-
tions)149 and
(d) who alternately play reciprocal roles.150 
(e) Finally, even when group interactions give rise to
efficient norms, the norms will most likely be efficient
when applied to members of the group itself and
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perhaps those in privity with them (insiders rather
than outsiders).151
These factors are listed in no particular order, and they interact
and overlap, though the literature seems to stress small group size
and a high frequency of interactions as the most important ones.152
Furthermore, the presence of any one of these factors is not strictly
necessary;153 rather, the list should be taken as a “best case”
scenario for the creation of efficient norms. To put it differently, one
should have more confidence in the social utility of a norm that
arises under the confluence of all these circumstances than in a
norm that arises in the presence of only one of them, though in
principle both norms could be efficient.
The interaction of these factors is also important. More of one
may make up for another. A reduction in group size may offset a
decrease in frequency of interactions, and vice versa. Furthermore,
some factors are correlated with others. All things being equal, as
group size increases maintaining the same level of homogeneity
becomes harder—the perennial dilemma of class actions. And the
smaller the group, the more frequent the dealings between any pair
of members. Now, a few more words can be said about the role of
these circumstances in facilitating the emergence of efficient norms.
1. Group Size
Social norms scholars have attempted to illustrate the efficiency
of norms through case studies of various communities. Ellickson’s
influential study of cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California154
is the most famous of these, and most scholars adopt his focus on
“close-knit groups”—small, discrete, and insular populations.155 The
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[hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]; Bernstein, supra note 21, at 714 n.14; Ellickson, supra
note 108, at 84.
156. See ELLICKSON, supra note 125, at 181.
157. See id. 
158. See McAdams, supra note 155, at 2241 n.11.
159. Recent literature has begun to explore situations in which a larger group or one with
norms literature suggests that, other things being equal, the
customs of a smaller group are more likely to be efficient than those
of a large one. 
Ellickson notes that in a small group it is relatively cheap for
members to monitor each other’s actions, making it easier to detect
norm violators.156 Detection, however, is useless without a way to
punish. In a small group, members more likely are dependent on
each other for reputation (which makes future cooperation
possible)157 or esteem (valued in itself).158 Interdependence creates
the means of sanctioning. Information circulates more easily in a
small group, which is crucial because esteem and reputation are
informational currency. 
Yet this only explains how and why the public good of enforce-
ment would be provided within the group. It does little to explain
why the norm being enforced would more likely be welfare enhanc-
ing. Perhaps general knowledge of reputation directs group
members toward interactions with those who adhere to what the
other group members perceive as the better norm. Or perhaps
smallness is important to efficiency only to the extent it is accompa-
nied by other favorable circumstances.
The terms “small” or “close-knit” group are purely ones of degree.
The same is true of the other factors, such as homogeneity, dis-
cussed below. What counts as “large” or “small” depends on the
subject matter of the group’s interactions, the stakes, the nature of
the relations between group members, and other factors. Group size,
therefore, is a very imperfect indicator for predicting whether a
given population’s norms will be efficient. But group size, like
homogeneity and the other factors, does allow for marginal predic-
tions. An increase in group size will, at the margin, decrease the
likelihood of efficient norms emerging or persisting. In keeping with
the case studies, one might tentatively define the upper limit of
group size as that dictated by the requirement of a face-to-face
society.159
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weaker connections between members could develop robust and perhaps welfare-enhancing
norms. Lior Strahilevitz has argued that such a phenomenon can be observed even on
computer networks such as Napster, Strahilevitz, supra note 155, at 361-63, which cannot be
considered “small” in any sense of the word; eBay might be another example. See eBay Home
Page, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). If these large networks do give rise
to efficient norms, it should draw attention to the mechanisms by which they do so.
The electronic medium facilitates the establishment and monitoring of reputation, as well
as private enforcement. See Strahilevitz, supra note 155, at 365 n.31 (arguing that “the salient
theoretical issue is not the size of the relevant community per se,” but rather “the community
members’ ability to monitor instances of noncooperation and communicate with fellow
members about each member’s reputation”). By making information cheaper, technology
increases the size of the community in which efficient customs can emerge. 
160. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 12.
161. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
162. See ELLICKSON, supra note 125, at 178-80. 
163. Many kinds of homogeneity will be relevant—different discount rates, different
endowments, different values.
2. Repeat Transactions
Group members should frequently interact with each other, and
expect to do so in the future. Custom evolves not from someone
coming up with a good norm, but from undirected “widespread
imitation and adaptation.”160 Hayek sees customs as encoding the
diffuse information of myriad actors—more information than can be
known by a central planner.161 The norm thus must be the distilla-
tion of a broad set of transactions. If norm development is an
evolutionary process, thick transactions provide the necessary
“mutations” for the selection mechanism of self-interest to act upon.
But because none of the norms chosen by any pair of members was
necessarily the result of great deliberation, it would take many
transactions to ensure the welfare-maximizing rule emerges.
Furthermore, future transactions are needed to facilitate informal
sanctions.162 
3. Homogeneity
Homogeneity also makes it easier for efficient norms to emerge.163
It makes it more likely that a norm developed by some group
members will reflect the interests of all. It also makes easier certain
types of enforcement—such as reputational sanctions or the
conferral of esteem. Reputation depends on third parties character-
izing a state’s conduct as cooperative or uncooperative. When third
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parties have heterogenous value systems and political agendas,
there is less reason for them to rely on each other’s statements
about whether a state with which they interacted was cooperative.
But the principal import of homogeneity lies in its relation to the
parties’ ability to play reciprocal roles across a series of interactions.
4. Reciprocal Roles
Social norms are most likely to be efficient when the parties to the
norm play alternate roles in their interactions. In the context of
commercial transactions, this would mean they are buyers one day
and sellers the next, as in the diamond exchanges studied by Lisa
Bernstein.164 The same can be said of other groups held up as
examples of efficient property norms. Ellickson’s cattle ranchers
both were liable to be trespassers, if their cattle walked onto their
neighbor’s land, and trespassees, if their neighbor’s cattle strayed
onto their land.165 Turning to another classic example, whalers have
a highly reticulated set of norms governing possession of whales
pursued by multiple vessels.166 These norms prioritize the rights of
vessels who gave chase, who made fast, and who ultimately brought
in the whale. Over a long enough time period, any vessel is likely,
at some time, to be first to give chase and first to make fast; one
vessel has interests in all camps. Thus, the norm whalers have
developed would be more likely to resolve the competing interests
of first to chase and first to put a harpoon in, because each party
internalizes the costs and benefits of both facets of the rule. 
When parties alternate roles over numerous interactions, both
will seek joint welfare-maximizing rules—or rather, each party will
seek the rule that maximizes his individual welfare, which in the
reciprocal roles scenario will also happen to be the socially optimal
rule. As a result, transactors will actually seek efficient norms,
rather than engage in strategic and opportunistic behavior.167 
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incrementally to find the best set of accommodations to advance their joint welfare”); see also
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 137 (1971).
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Reciprocity is, of course, a version of the famous “veil of igno-
rance.”168 The veil illustrates that socially efficient rules can be
made when individuals put aside their knowledge of what particular
role they will have in society. In reality, it is hard to step behind the
veil because one knows what role one plays. Reciprocity is as close
as it gets because it is when one plays all relevant roles. Still,
complete reciprocity will be rare—for example, some whalers are
better at spotting the whale, some better at sinking in the
harpoon—and thus the different rules of possession will disparately
impact them based on the differences in their talents.
Again, these factors are interrelated. Reciprocity is another way
of describing a homogeneity of interests. It is also facilitated by
thick interactions. One cannot have reciprocity without at least two
transactions, and the larger the number of transactions, the more
likely that roles will average out. 
5. Insiders vs. Outsiders
Groups may develop norms that increase their own welfare at the
expense of outsiders by externalizing costs onto them. Even those
scholars most optimistic about the welfare-maximizing potential of
customs would apply them only to the groups in which they arise
and to those with preexisting relationships with the group.169 The
possibility of externalities raises two issues. The first is about
assessing the efficiency of customs. Even robust and popular norms
may be inefficient when the welfare of the larger society is taken
into account. This remains a possibility unless the custom is truly
universal, or no meaningful difference between participants and
nonparticipants exists. The second point deals with the scope of a
custom. The externality concern suggests that one should be
cautious about legalizing a custom, and particularly cautious about
binding nonparticipants who may be its victims. 
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III. ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMS
Customary practices can be efficient, but whether they should be
given legal recognition depends on whether they are likely to be
efficient, especially in comparison to alternative sources of norms.
This Part examines whether international custom has the hall-
marks of efficiency discussed in Part II. It draws on the optimistic
accounts of custom to see whether the circumstances favoring the
development of welfare-maximizing norms obtain in the interna-
tional context. If the custom skeptics are right—if custom does not,
under the right circumstances, develop reliably towards effi-
ciency—the welfarist case for CIL would be even weaker than
presented here. Before these questions are fully explored, a few
words should be said about some recent literature that argues CIL
norms are efficient.
A. Efficient Custom Literature
A few recent articles have used game-theoretic models to show
CIL can be efficient;170 that is to say, gains to cooperation and Nash
equilibria exist in at least some of the games nations play and CIL
can help nations realize those gains.171 These articles are important
contributions to international law scholarship, and a few words
should be said about how this Article differs. This Article does not
doubt that international custom could in theory be efficient, or that
many CIL rules are in fact efficient. However, unlike in common
law, where the efficiency of customary norms is a rebuttable
presumption and thus the obligation of the norms is itself contin-
gent, CIL doctrine makes a much stronger implicit claim about the
efficiency of international custom. Because CIL automatically
legalizes custom, the relevant question is not whether customs will
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172. See Parisi & Ghei, supra note 170, at 122-23.
173. Id. at 105, 115.
174. See Norman & Trachtman, supra note 170, at 541, 554-55.
175. This is not intended to defend reputation as an effective or reliable enforcement
mechanism in international law. Reputation is but one of many things states care about, and
a good reputation does not always have a positive value. Some states, for example, might
value a reputation as an unpredictable, “make my day” rogue. See Andrew T. Guzman, A
Compliance-based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1847-51 (2002) (arguing
that, though reputation drives compliance with CIL, this does not mean that states value
sometimes be efficient, but whether the net effects on states’ welfare
justify their automatic legalization. 
Thus, where this Article parts company with the recent literature
is on the question of whether the circumstances that would support
efficient norms could be said to broadly obtain. For example, Parisi
and Ghei use a game theory model to show that, because CIL norms
are generally reciprocal—applying equally to all parties—they
should be expected to improve states’ net welfare.172 They recognize
that in addition to reciprocity, efficient norms require that two other
conditions obtain—“role reversibility and repeat interactions.”173
Similarly, Norman and Trachtman note that the heterogeneity
among players and other factors reduce the likelihood of efficient
outcomes.174 This Article is in accord with all the aforementioned
analysis; the question is what role these circumstances obtain
among states in the contexts that give rise to customary norms. This
Article argues that heterogeneity, low interaction frequency, and
nonreciprocity obtain to a significant degree, and perhaps to a
greater degree than the earlier papers suggest.  
B. A World Community?
The set of nations in the world in some ways resembles the kind
of decentralized group whose interactions might give rise to efficient
norms. The group is composed of a finite number of identifiable
parties. Each party is aware of the existence and identities of all the
others. Indeed, nations grant each other recognition, creating at
least some minimal legal relationship and the possibility of further
interactions. Moreover, nations sometimes benefit from cooperating
with each other, and can expect to have opportunities for coopera-
tion in the future. This could make a reputation for compliance with
group norms at least somewhat valuable.175 States’ interests in
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176. The United States recognizes 193 sovereign states—the Vatican, recognized by the
United States, has chosen to not join the United Nations. See U.S. Department of State,
Independent States in the World, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm (last visited Nov.
24, 2006). Taiwan is not recognized by the United States nor a member of the U.N., though
it once was. Furthermore, numerous entities like Gaza and Northern Cyprus have all of the
characteristics of states (albeit weak ones), and, in the former instance, substantial
international recognition. See Abraham Bell, Astrategies of Sovereignty: Or, What Is Gaza?
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/int-law/bell.pdf (last
visited Nov. 24, 2006)).  
177. See Department of Public Information, United Nations Growth in United Nations
Membership, 1945-2005, http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2006);
United Nations, List of Member States, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last
visited Nov. 24, 2006).
178. See U.S. Census Bureau, World Population Information, http://www.census.gov/ipc/
www/world.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2006).
reputation facilitate the emergence of norms by creating a nonlegal
enforcement mechanism: the fact of noncompliance, if known, hurts
reputation. Moreover, states can engage in informal self-help.
Yet relationships are subject specific. Barge owners have a
relationship with tugboat owners in regard to the towing of barges;
the custom of the latter as to, say, employment contracts, would
hardly be within the ambit of the barge-tug relationship. Other
relationships, like the family, have a broader scope, and are treated
as such by law. Similarly, the scope of international relationships
varies. At a minimum, one can expect most states to have a
relationship with regard to diplomatic relations. Yet not all nations
have equally thick relations with each other regarding matters of
security, extradition, and so forth. 
A more thorough consideration of the factors thought to promote
the emergence of welfare-maximizing norms shows that, at least
today, many do not generally obtain.
C. Group Size
There are roughly two hundred nations on Earth.176 The United
Nations has 192 member states; it had 51 at its creation in 1945,
and around 144 halfway through its history in 1975.177 The number
of nations has grown by nearly four hundred percent over the
past sixty years—faster than the number of people on earth.178 This
does not mean that today’s larger number of states precludes the
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International Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1243, 1247-48 (2004) (arguing that the growth in the
number of nations makes CIL norms harder to identify because the practices of many more
states must be explored “before any claims can be made about universal practice,” and that
“the sheer volume of this enterprise ... is daunting”). 
possibility of welfare-maximizing custom.179 The theory of customs’
efficiency does not in itself dictate what group size counts as “too
large.” However, at the margin, increases in group size weaken the
ability of groups to produce and maintain welfare-maximizing
norms.180 As the number of nations in the world increases, it
becomes less likely that international customary norms will be
efficient.181 Although we do not know whether additional nations are
marginal or inframarginal, the rapid growth in group size should
constitute grounds for caution in transforming custom into CIL. 
 Increases in group size make monitoring more costly and create
information asymmetries between pairs of states when they
interact. There are simply more members to observe, which suggests
violations will more often go undetected—this is the typical story of
a move from a face-to-face to an anonymous society. Whether a
breach occurred is judged by observing states. But each state is now
confronted with many more situations to judge without any increase
in resources for doing so. Indeed, increases in the number of states
often accompany decreases in the size and presumably the resources
of preexisting states. 
The information and monitoring problems associated with growth
in state size will be less true of subject-matter areas in which
violations principally harm one or a few countries and are in some
way self-evident, such as assaults on ambassadors. In such scenar-
ios, the likelihood that violations will be detected does not substan-
tially change with changes in group size; however, dissemination of
the information about the violation becomes impaired as group size
increases. Increases in size will be particularly problematic in
contexts where the violation is “victimless” in the sense that a small
injury results to many or all nations. This is especially true of
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human rights norms, the violation of which can be entirely internal
to a state and thus unobservable to outsiders.  
D. Repeat Transactions
Most nations have some kind of interaction with most other
nations. But the density and quality of these transactions varies
greatly across nations and across subject matters. Take the law of
armed reprisal, for example. Mexico may have some transactions
with the United States on this subject. But reprisal is not an area
where the United States interacts with Swaziland. Israel has
dealings of a military nature with all of its neighbors, but not with
Belgium. In regard to the thickness of transactions, Mexico’s
dealings with other nations vis-à-vis armed reprisal are quite thin;
Israel’s are quite thick, but still limited to a certain subgroup of
states. 
To take a starker example, landlocked states have no interactions
with other states with respect to the law of the sea. They may have
opinions about it, but cannot transform them into conduct, the stuff
from which custom is formed. Nations that share a common
waterway will interact very frequently, almost constantly, regarding
its management. But that does not mean they will have any
interactions with other sets of riparian states—the experience of the
states that share the Danube is different from that of the states
which share the Rio Grande. 
If one were to map these interactions by connecting pairs of
nations with a line each time they interacted in regard to a subject
matter, one would see not a seamless web tying together a cohesive
“international community,” but a collection of distinct (but often
overlapping) groups. The cohesiveness of the groups would also vary
considerably. Some pairs of states would have no connections.
Others would be connected by thin lines, some by thick lines—
representing a repeated course of dealing.
Interactions are not easily quantifiable because a state not doing
something—fishing in a certain area, for example—could be a be-
havior for the purposes of developing custom. To the extent customs
impose negative rather than positive obligations, one would expect
the relevant interactions to be largely invisible. One could, however,
measure opportunities for interaction if certain observables correlate
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with a higher likelihood of interactions—for example, the size and
range of a nation’s fishing fleet.
In CIL, each nation may have participated in the relevant
behavior on only a few occasions. Indeed, with many areas of IL,
occasions to participate would be few and far between. If the stakes
on any one occasion are not particularly high, it is easy to imagine
states repeating their or other states’ prior practice even if the
practice is not joint welfare enhancing. The cost to each state of
adhering to the past practice will be small if the situation rarely
arises. One could imagine this cost being lower than the combined
cost of thinking of a new practice and the reputational penalty for
defecting from a perceived customary norm. Although the latter cost
should not be overestimated, it could, in low-stakes situations,
exceed compliance costs, especially because the costs of an ineffi-
cient norm in a low-frequency context are time discounted, whereas
reputational costs are incurred immediately. 
E. Homogeneity
As with group size, it is hard to say how much heterogeneity is
“too much.” Heterogeneity is also difficult to quantify because,
among other things, it occurs along many dimensions. Still, the
group of states in the world varies greatly along every potentially
relevant dimension, and this heterogeneity has increased over time.
There are many kinds of value diversity. People in different nations
vary greatly in their attitudes to moral, social, and political
issues.182 States have a wide range of regime types, including
federal republic, parliamentary democracy, communist tyranny,
absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy, liberal democracy,
theocracy, military dictatorship, and military-backed authoritarian-
ism. National religious beliefs include Catholicism, various types of
Protestantism, Sunni Islam, Shiite Islam, various types of Eastern
Orthodoxy, Shinto, Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, and secularism;
some states incorporate religion, others do not. In addition to value
diversity there is an even broader range of heterogeneity in the
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to Tokelau’s $1,500,000. See Rank Order—GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), in CENT.
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$518,100,000,000 annually on its military; Sao Tome and Principe spends $581,700. See RANK
ORDER—MILITARY EXPENDITURES—DOLLAR FIGURES, in CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK (2006), available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rank
order/2067rank.html.
185. See, e.g., STATISTICS DIV., UNITED NATIONS, ENERGY BALANCES AND ELECTRICITY
PROFILES (2002) (presenting data on heterogeneity of national energy production and
consumption); Statistics Div., United Nations, Water Resources: Long Term Annual Average,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/waterresources.htm (last updated June 2005)
(presenting statistics on disparities in fresh water endowments of nations).
186. See Lant Pritchett, Divergence, Big Time, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (1997).
187. See Ramsey, supra note 181, at 1246-48 (describing the empirical difficulties of
ascertaining state practice).
material circumstances and abilities of states. Nations range widely
in economic wealth,183 military power,184 geographic circumstances,
and natural resources endowments.185 Moreover, productivity levels
and standards of living have been diverging worldwide in the last
century.186
Like increasing group size, increasing heterogeneity creates
monitoring and informational problems. It brings with it, among
many other things, more official languages, as well as an increase
in the types of legal systems in use. These things may seem trivial,
but they vastly increase the cost of something as simple as figuring
out what a nation’s law on a particular matter is.187 Value heteroge-
neity exacerbates the problem. Because nations have several
fundamentally different and often antagonistic normative perspec-
tives, one nation accusing another of violating a custom will mean
little to countries with antagonistic values. Venezuela accusing the
United States of violating international law, for example, may harm
the United States’ reputation with Cuba, but not with Australia.
The different values-communities do not trade in the same
reputational currency. 
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F. Reciprocal Roles
The reciprocity of roles will vary greatly across contexts. In some
contexts, states play symmetrical roles. For example, a state may be
as likely to send as to receive diplomats. States sharing a common
sea might have similar propensities to overfish and to resist
overfishing. On the other hand, a lack of symmetry exists across
many legal contexts. Many nations are much more likely to be
borrowers than lenders. Although most states could be military
aggressors and military targets, many states are much more likely
to be one rather than the other: there are repeat aggressors, and
repeat victims. A nation with universal military supremacy, like the
United States, will usually, if not always, be an aggressor. Dictator-
ships are more likely to be aggressors than democracies.188 Even
with two nations equally likely to be aggressor and victim, one
might be more likely to be a repeat winner (Britain, for example),
the other, a repeat loser (Poland, for example). Obviously such
states would favor different norms. 
G. Problems of Custom Formation
It has been suggested by custom optimists that if customary
practices arise under conditions unfavorable to their formation, one
should expect them to nonetheless be efficient.189 In other words,
any custom that emerges will be efficient; when circumstances do
not favor the creation of efficient custom, no custom will emerge.
This Article does not suggest that many inefficient customs will
emerge; only that some will, and this may be a relatively high
proportion of all customs. This Part will suggest two reasons why
emergence and efficiency are at least partially independent
questions. This explains why, in circumstances that do not favor
efficient custom, one may sometimes find inefficient customs rather
than an absence of customs.  
Recall that “custom” for the purposes of CIL need not be univer-
sal; rather, CIL makes the customs of some nations binding on all.190
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193. See Guzman, supra note 1, at 164 (“It will often be difficult to know if treaties are
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A subglobal group of nations might possess the relevant characteris-
tics for an efficient customary practice to develop. Yet a customary
practice arising among such a subgroup is not necessarily welfare
improving as applied to the broader group of world states. And
nothing in the analysis in the Part above precludes the development
of customs by some group of states that improves the welfare of
participating states at the expense of nonparticipating ones. Because
CIL does not require participation by all nations, and does not
provide for an easy opt-out, it may elevate norms that are efficient
as between some states to a level of generality at which they are no
longer efficient.
Second, changed circumstances account for much of what can
render customs welfare reducing. Assume that a welfare-enhancing
custom develops among nations. As more diverse nations join the
group, the norm that increased joint welfare for the original group
might no longer do so for the expanded group. At this point, the
norm could collapse because of open and persistent violation. Yet if
the stakes in any one interaction were small enough, or the
penalties imposed by other states on defectors high enough, the
custom could persist despite its inefficiency.191
H. The Problem of Codified Custom
Some multilateral treaties purport to codify or restate preexisting
custom. Treaties are presumably welfare maximizing under the
demanding Pareto criterion: they have the unanimous consent of the
parties to the treaty, and thus presumably make all parties better
off. Yet some of these treaties involve areas of custom that in the
account presented here would not be expected to be efficient.192 
This demands an explanation. First, not all multilateral treaties
that purport to codify preexisting custom actually do so; often they
legislate as much as they restate.193 Claims made by commentators
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or international organizations about a treaty’s declaratory status
are not necessarily true. (Indeed, given the difficulty of exiting a
custom and the ease of exiting treaties, pure codification would have
limited utility.) Second, most treaties that do codify custom also
create new rules.194 If one is making a treaty to govern an area
previously governed only partially by CIL norms, it may make
sense—some potential signatories may demand—that the treaty
lock-on or clearly state what has not been changed. Thus even if the
codified custom is inefficient, standing by itself, its inclusion in the
treaty may be necessary to the adoption of the legislated portions.
Third, multilateral treaties may not have any expectation of
enforcement, and so codifying inefficient custom brings no added
costs. Fourth, even multilateral treaties are rarely global, while CIL
presumptively is. A CIL norm that may be globally inefficient could
in theory become efficient if even a few nations are excluded.
Finally, this Article does not suggest that all CIL norms reduce
states’ welfare. Rather, the more modest contention is that the
predictors of efficient custom do not generally apply in the interna-
tional setting. Nonetheless, particular norms may in fact be welfare
promoting, even if just through fortuity. Indeed, the most famous
and settled examples of treaties that codify international law
involve areas where the analysis presented here suggests efficiency
is actually likely.195
 I. Summary
A brief consideration of the circumstances thought to encourage
the development of welfare-enhancing norms casts doubt on their
robustness in the international context. Although this suggests that
few customs will develop at all, it also has cautionary implications
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for the efficiency of those customs that do come into being. In the
absence of small group size, homogeneity and symmetric roles, thick
transactions, and the confinement of the norm to those who made
it, it is quite plausible for customs to be socially undesirable. Thus
the reasons one might think customs generate good norms do not
strongly obtain in the context of CIL. The extent to which these
factors do or do not obtain varies heavily across areas of law and
groups of nations, suggesting that little can be said about the
efficiency of CIL norms in the abstract. Whether a custom should be
suspect depends heavily on the area of law. 
Because the discussion is entirely qualitative, it cannot be known
for certain how the current international context measures up, and
one is left with impressionistic comparisons to other norm contexts.
It is certainly plausible that the number of nations is small enough
to support efficient customs. On the other hand, on most issues the
degree of heterogeneity and nonreciprocity seems far higher than for
most norm groups. This is far from a certain case for the efficiency
of international customs. The international environment is such
that the mere existence of a customary practice should not be taken
as evidence of the custom’s social desirability.
Stronger statements can be made at the margins. An increase in
group size and heterogeneity, or decreases in reciprocity of roles, all
weaken the likelihood of customs being socially optimal. All of these
changes have occurred in the past fifty years.196 Norms theory would
suggest that, as a result, CIL would have become both thinner and
less efficient during this period. Surprisingly, the rapid growth in
group size and so forth has been contemporaneous with increasingly
broad and ambitious claims about CIL, both positive and
normative.197 The understanding of when and why customary norms
might be socially desirable suggests that in times when there are
dramatic changes in these variables, a cautious approach should be
taken to the legalization of emerging customs and the continued
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treatment of existing CIL norms as law—at least until it becomes
more apparent whether the changes are occurring at the margin.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CIL DOCTRINE
A. What Alternative to CIL?
When scholars of custom speak of norms being inefficient, they
can mean one of two things. The stronger claim is that custom can
actually reduce aggregate welfare.198 In other words, it is not merely
suboptimal in the sense that it fails to achieve a Pareto-superior
Nash equilibrium. Rather, it actually reduces net welfare compared
to the situation where the custom is simply abandoned. This does
not mean no one benefits from it, but only that the benefits to the
winners are exceeded by the costs to the losers. The weaker claim
is that customs may fail to achieve optimal results,199 that is, there
are stable equilibria with higher net welfare than the customary
rule achieves. This Part will discuss the applicability of both
understandings. It does not take a position on which is the better
way to think about the efficiency of custom, as the literature is itself
inconclusive on whether custom will develop the optimal rule or
simply a welfare-improving one.
In the former sense, when customs are said to be inefficient, it is
in relation to some superior source of norms. If there are no
alternatives to CIL, its “inefficiency” is meaningless, because it is
impossible to improve on it. Thus it is important to specify the
alternatives that may be superior, from a state welfare perspective,
to CIL. In private law, the judge or jury—rather than custom—
determines what constitutes reasonable conduct and thus what
constitutes a violation of the legal norm.200 Courts and custom are
alternative institutions for assessing a practice’s efficiency.201 The
common law’s moderate custom skepticism reflects the view that,
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because the fact-finder can be informed both by the custom and by
other information, it can selectively legalize only the efficient
customs.202 In this view, an independent judicial determination of
what should be the legal standard will have better welfare effects
than a CIL-style blanket incorporation. So in private custom,
“inefficient” means relative to the norms that would be promulgated
by courts. Similarly, the welfare effects of CIL must be evaluated in
comparison to the alternative institutions.
1. No Custom
Even custom optimists agree that the sometimes “inefficient”
informal norms reduce group welfare relative to a situation of no
custom at all.203 This is a standard and intuitive way to evaluate the
efficiency of a norm—comparing a world with the norm to one
without. The previous Part argued that under the circumstances
that obtain between nations, there is little reason to think that the
norms that would emerge would increase joint welfare. If custom is
inefficient in this strong sense, simply abandoning it and leaving
the question unregulated would improve welfare.204
2. Treaties
Custom and treaties are coequal sources of law. Treaties, unlike
custom, are presumptively Pareto efficient, since they require the
explicit consent of all their members. However, there is some
authority suggesting that treaties are trumped by a contrary
subsequent custom.205 The analysis of the previous Part shows that
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as between custom and treaty, the latter is certainly more likely to
produce welfare-maximizing norms, and should never yield to the
former. Of course, situations where a custom conflicts with a treaty
will be rare,206 in which case it is again a choice between custom or
no custom.
3. Adjudication
Questions about the application of CIL increasingly arise in
judicial settings. International custom can be an issue in cases
before an international tribunal, such as the International Court of
Justice or various war crimes tribunals; ad hoc arbitral bodies; or
national courts. In such situations the alternative norm-creating
institution is the court. 
Common law judges are entrusted to weed out inefficient customs
and incorporate efficient ones. Thus one alternative to international
custom is the standard one—courts. Indeed, in international law,
where the correlates of efficient custom are particularly weak, one
would think that a combination of judge-made rules and selectively-
incorporated custom would be even more likely to out-perform pure
custom. This suggests that courts should be as free to ignore
international customs as they are to disregard industry norms.207
Such selective incorporation can be implemented simply through
judges trying to figure out whether a particular custom improves
welfare and, if so, whether a still better rule can be devised by the
court. Or the court could apply Cooter’s “structural adjudication,”
incorporating only those customary norms that developed under
conditions that suggest they are welfare promoting.208 Of course,
nations might not wish to give international adjudicators such broad
authority to make common law. And international judges may differ
from domestic ones in their ability to screen out welfare-reducing
norms or devise welfare-improving ones. Yet, at least for judges and
juries in the United States, who are allowed to impose their view of
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reasonableness in the face of contrary private custom, their
independent determination seems to be an attractive alternate
source of obligation to international custom. 
4. Special Custom
From an efficiency perspective, international law’s treatment of
general and special custom gets things backwards. Recall that the
default level of analysis for CIL is the world, the most general level
possible. Customs will be more likely to serve social welfare when
they emerge from and are applied within groups that are small and
homogenous, and have thick and reciprocal interactions between
members. CIL, then, seeks to find and apply customs on the level
where they are least likely to be efficient. Special custom has almost
no place in CIL. It should be the core of CIL. 
Because special custom is more likely to be welfare maximiz-
ing—for the subset of nations to which it applies—CIL should begin
with and focus on the customary practices of subsets of nations.
Moreover, special custom should trump general custom when the
two conflict because of our greater confidence in the efficiency of the
former. Making the legalization of behavior regularities track their
likely efficiency would, to be sure, require a major reorientation of
CIL. Instead of a monolithic body of “customary international law,”
CIL should consist of a collection of subglobal customary regimes.
These could be narrow or broad, defined along one dimension or a
combination of dimensions, such as subject matter, geographic
region, or the states’ economic, political, ethnic, or religious
characteristics. Of course, this is exactly how custom is
operationalized in domestic law. In private law, courts are more
ready to legalize custom when the custom arose within a tight-knit
group and can only be applied within it.209 When commercial custom
is in question, courts look separately to the custom of separate
economic and geographic groups.210
Of course, special customs should govern relations only within the
relevant subgroups. They provide no answer to disputes between
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members of different subgroups. Furthermore, there may not be a
special custom dealing with the question because of the ease of
codifying subglobal customs into treaties. But this just means the
alternate institution to global custom is subglobal treaties. The
incompleteness of special custom would not necessarily be some-
thing to lament. Current CIL doctrine provides a legal answer to
more questions, but there is less reason to trust that answer than
there is with special custom. Special custom provides fewer answers
with a higher degree of confidence. Unless there is a particular
value in global homogeneity, there is no reason to think that the
former approach is preferable.211 
B. Persistent Objectors
The theory of customary efficiency developed in private law
scholarship argues for a more robust version of the persistent
objector rule. The persistent objector doctrine in CIL makes states’
opting out of an emerging customary norm difficult.212 States must
make their objections known openly and clearly during the norm’s
creation. Like with adverse possession, an interruption in a state’s
hostile posture to the norm is thought to foreclose its persistent
objector status.213
The existence of objectors in itself shows some heterogeneity
within the group. Objection can be strategic or sincere. If group
members play reciprocal roles in repeat interactions, little strategic
objection to emerging norms would exist—and if roles are not
reciprocal, norms that emerge from the group are already suspect.
As has been seen, few, if any, international customs are truly
universal. This raises the possibility that the customary practices
impose externalities on nonparticipants. Custom can do this even
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when it does not bind the nonparticipants, but surely it has far
greater potential to impose externalities when the customary
practices will bind outsiders. Thus some objector doctrine is
necessary to shield against norms that impose harmful externali-
ties. The persistent-objector doctrine treats some objectors as at
least acquiescent participants if their objection is not systematic
enough. This effectively lowers the number of active participants
required for a behavioral regularity to be considered general enough
to become CIL, and thus invites inefficient norms. 
In private law, group customs may sometimes be enforced against
dissident members of the group.214 Yet for members of most small
groups, exit is possible. Thus the dissenter’s decision to remain
within the group can be seen as evidence that the costs of the norm
do not outweigh the benefits of membership. Yet CIL is cast on a
global scale; with no exit option from the world community,
persistent objection is the most a persistent objector can do. 
The important question should be not whether a nation objected,
but whether it participated in the norm. If the persistent objector
has excluded itself from the norm—from its costs and benefits—then
even under the optimistic theory of custom there would not be
reason to think that applying the custom to the objector would
increase social welfare. If the persistent objector could have but did
not participate in the conduct from which the custom arose, then the
existence of the custom does not suggest that it would be efficient as
applied against the objector. The harder question arises when a
state’s adherence to an emerging norm is imperfect or sporadic.
Cases of partial participation inevitably pose difficult line-drawing
problems. But there seems little justification for the strict
persistent-objector doctrine, which requires early and constant
objection. This seems to denigrate the value of experience, which is
what custom is built on. A decision to opt out after first participat-
ing in the conduct should have the same effect as such a decision
made at the outset. 
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C. New States 
CIL’s treatment of new states cannot be reconciled with the
welfarist accounts of custom. Customs at best improve the welfare
of a group and those in bargaining relationships with group
members.215 Applying customs to those who did not have an
opportunity to participate in their formation,216 either directly or
through their contractual dealings with direct participants, is not
efficient.217 Yet under the conventional view of CIL, new states are
bound by all customary norms that exist when they come into
being.218
New states obviously did not participate in the development of
existing customs. Nor could they conceivably have bargained with
those states that did—nonexistence creates insurmountable
transaction costs. If states were fungible—that is, if the group was
homogenous and members played symmetric roles—a custom that
was good for existing states presumably would also be good for the
expanded group, including new states. The circumstances discussed
in Part III, however, show that at least on the level of global custom,
there is no reason to think existing states’ customary practices will
also serve the interests of future states. New states may have
preferences quite distinct from preexisting states. Indeed, since new
states will almost always be formed out of preexisting states, the
interests of current and future states are predictably antagonistic
to some extent. 
Thus even the optimistic welfarist case for custom would not
extend it to new states.219 The new state issue is not peripheral to
CIL: a substantial majority of currently existing states are “new” in
that they came into existence in the past sixty years, and a sizable
minority were born in the past fifteen years.220 Exempting new
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states from preexisting customs would obviously fracture CIL’s
efforts at universalism. Of course, exempting new states from
existing rules of CIL would not mean that new states could not join
these customs. New states should be able to join customs the way
the preexisting states did—by engaging in the customary
practices.221 
D. Instant Custom, Soft Law, and State Practice
There has been an increasing tendency in IL to treat declarations,
proclamations, votes at the U.N. General Assembly, and similar
manifestations of sentiment as equivalent to state action. This has
been called “soft law,” or “instant custom,” because these kind of
instruments can be quickly produced, without waiting for the
circumstances they contemplate to transpire.222 This is part of a
broader move to elevate opinio juris over state practice.
None of the stories about why evolved custom would be efficient
supports the legalization of instant custom. The value of custom
comes from encoding lessons learned through experience, which
must have a basis in practice. Custom advances by states trying on,
rejecting, and modifying various norms until an equilibrium is
reached. This requires multiple rounds of interaction.
Actions are costly in a way that statements are not. Indeed,
statements and votes offer a broad array of material from which one
might infer custom precisely because these activities are so cheap.
When states develop norms through practice, the customs will, in
the optimistic account, incorporate information about both the costs
and benefits of the norm.223 The normative allure of custom comes
from its ability to encode large amounts of diffuse information. The
kind of knowledge custom synthesizes is situational—that is, it is
the aggregation of numerous judgments about the costs and benefits
of given conduct in defined circumstances. All of this information is
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missing from “soft law” and “instant custom.” Thus instant custom
has the weakness of advisory opinions, and state practice the
strength of case-by-case adjudication. Indeed, without state practice
one is no longer in the realm of custom. “Instant custom” is really
just legislation by another name. Instant custom is not necessarily
inefficient; however, its efficiency cannot be defended through the
traditional arguments about the efficiency of custom. Because
custom combines the knowledge of group members over time, it can
claim access to hidden wisdom, whereas legislation must be
defended on its own merits.
E. NGOs
By monitoring and publicly reporting on the activities of all
countries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may reduce the
informational problems caused by the increase in group size and
heterogeneity. Such groups focus particularly on areas in which
direct monitoring by other states is most difficult, such as human
rights and environmental issues. Some such groups, like the Red
Cross, have been given such a task by treaty.224 These groups raise
funds in many Western states, allowing them to employ staffs with
considerable expertise in many countries and to mount extensive
research efforts. One could imagine such groups providing a global
informational currency that would make the group of world states
work more like a close-knit community. Their reports could provide
an informationally level playing field.
While NGOs have produced some benefits in this regard, they are
limited by the very problems of heterogeneity and group size that
they could conceivably solve. NGOs, like states, have scarce
resources, and thus must select which states to which they will
devote their attention; even the most globally minded groups must
ignore many countries.225 Moreover, some places are more remote
and dangerous than others, making it more difficult for NGOs to
operate there. The problem is of course exacerbated by the differen-
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tial cooperation various nations offer. Most importantly, for NGO
reports to serve as a global informational currency, they would have
to be regarded by all states as entirely impartial and apolitical. If
the organizations are thought to have ideological preferences, the
information they produce loses much of its value. Information that
is perceived as biased will affect reputation (or esteem) only among
those nations sympathetic to the NGO. 
In short, decreasing costs of travel and communication have made
it easier for nongovernmental actors to play a monitoring role. In
principle this could make the nations of the world more like a close-
knit group for efficient norm purposes. But currently it is not clear
if these groups have the resources or the perceived impartiality to
make this possible. 
V. A NEW APPROACH TO LEGALIZING STATE PRACTICE
This Article has shown that the treatment of custom in interna-
tional law differs greatly from common law,226 and from what
would be suggested by the social norms literature on efficient
customs.227 In particular, CIL’s global approach seeks to identify and
apply custom on the level at which it is least likely to be efficient.
Custom’s ability to improve social welfare will vary across subject
areas, geographic areas, and other fault lines. This Part illustrates
how one might reorient CIL along these dimensions, and offers some
examples. 
A. Structural Adjudication
Structural adjudication is a way to tailor existing CIL along lines
likely to correspond with efficiency.228 Once a CIL norm has been
identified through the standard criteria—general practice and
opinio juris229—an additional set of questions would be asked about
the circumstances in which the custom developed. The inquiry
would focus on whether the norm emerged in a context that would
support efficient norms. Thus one would look at the number of
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nations involved, their degree of homogeneity, the density of their
interactions, and the reciprocity of their roles. Customs would only
be given legal status when they arose in an environment conducive
to the production of efficient norms.
B. Diplomatic Relations
The law of diplomatic relations deals with ambassadorial contacts
between nations, and includes such issues as ambassadorial
immunity, diplomatic pouches, and the extraterritoriality of
embassies. It is one of the most venerable fields of CIL; the principal
norms have been around for at least several centuries.230 These
customs enjoy perhaps the greatest compliance of any CIL norms.
Host nations generally refrain from violating diplomatic protections
even in times of conflict with the sending state, or in the face of
significant popular pressure.231 Unlike many CIL norms, the law of
diplomatic relations has long enjoyed recognition and enforcement
by domestic courts. 
The group size here is substantial in that all nations engage in
diplomatic relations. However, interactions between states in this
area are relatively thick. Diplomatic ties are a constant, ongoing
matter between sending and receiving states. Indeed, the purpose
of sending and receiving diplomats is to maintain constant contact
with other nations. Moreover, nations have diplomatic ties with a
broad spectrum of other nations—no major subgroups of states
primarily engage in diplomatic relations between themselves.
Perhaps most importantly, diplomatic relations is an area in
which homogeneity and reciprocity is high. All nations both send
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and receive ambassadors to and from a large number of countries.232
There are no states that just send, and no states that just receive.
Indeed, sending and receiving go together, and thus states have the
proper incentives to develop norms that are neither too protective
of diplomats nor too dangerous. Moreover, each state sends
approximately one ambassador to each other state. Although the
size of the entire diplomatic mission varies greatly, a small state
both sends and receives small delegations. Thus all nations have
roughly homogenous stakes—one ambassador, more or less.233
C. War
The laws regarding the use of force—both the rules about when
states can resort to hostilities and what means they may use once
they begin—are perhaps the most high profile and the most
controversial in international law. Though treaties are very
important in this area, CIL is invoked repeatedly in these contexts.
Yet there is little reason to believe customs relating to war would be
efficient on a global scale.
Most nations are not in a position to war with most other nations;
they have neither the means nor the resources to do so. With
occasional exceptions, a nation’s use of force will be against
territorial neighbors. Thus practice relating to the use of force
naturally breaks down into the practices of relatively discrete
subglobal groups. This is another way of saying that any given state
has very thick interactions regarding the use of force with only a few
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other states. Most states have no interactions regarding the use of
force with most other states. 
Moreover, reciprocity is highly imperfect. Although all nations
may at some point be aggressor and victim, the odds of a given
nation playing each role are rarely even. There are repeat aggres-
sors and repeat defenders. One may start with the famous observa-
tion about democracies rarely fighting other democracies234 and
dictatorships often fighting each other, but role-specification in
practice can be even more precise.235 Furthermore, nations can have
some idea in advance which role they will be playing more often;
this of course is not independent of the decisions of other states. In
addition, the vast discrepancies in military power make some
nations likely winners and others likely losers. 
Some subgroups are more homogenous than others. Western
European nations share a common culture and religious heritage.
They also have relatively evenly matched militaries, and for many
centuries were regularly, if not constantly, at war. Under such
circumstances, one can imagine efficient norms emerging among
these states. By contrast, the Arab states and Israel, though
constantly at war, differ greatly in religion, culture, and military
ability. One would not expect their interactions to result in norms
that increase joint welfare. Thus it is difficult to see how generally
efficient norms could emerge in this area. However, war could be an
area rich in special customs. 
D. Human Rights
Human rights law expands the scope of international law beyond
the relations of states to include relations of states with individuals.
It posits that a state has international legal duties directly to
people, including its own nationals.236 Moreover, just as human
rights doctrine seeks to directly endow all individuals with interna-
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tional legal rights, it also seeks to make individuals personally
liable for violations of CIL.
Much of human rights law is a product of treaties, but it is not
limited to them.237 Customary human rights norms are said to
develop through the recognition of a right by a large number of
nations either in their municipal law or their diplomatic pronounce-
ments. When this threshold is reached, all nations are said to be
obligated to afford their nationals that right.
To the extent the CIL process can be expected to generate
efficient norms, it is through repeated interactions between players.
The higher the density of interaction, the stronger the claim for
efficiency. With human rights law, no reason exists to expect the
“customary” development of such law to move towards efficiency,
because it is not at all based on substantive interactions between
nations. The accounts of customary efficiency do not explain why
regularities in the separate human rights practices of states should
be elevated to the status of international obligation. By any account,
custom is a social phenomenon. To be sure, in the Hayekian account
customs are good because they incorporate the diffuse information
available to a multitude of individual actors.238 But they do this
through a process of interactions among the disparate elements,
with each actor bringing his private information to bear on each
interaction. Custom can arise from repeated transactions between
pairs of atomistic actors and grow to coordinate the interactions of
a complex web of actors. In the spontaneous order model, customs
develop towards efficiency, because in each separate transaction one
of the parties to the transaction would defect from a practice not
advantageous to him.239 The practices that persist are those that
both sides of a transaction have deemed advantageous. Thus judges
can be confident that, in legalizing a customary norm, they are
merely enforcing a rule developed by the parties themselves in their
mutual dealings. 
Human rights lack this crucial mutuality. Human rights norms
do not arise from dealings between states. Rather, they are the sum
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of the entirely individual actions of each state, not with respect to
other states but with respect to itself. Thus their utility as a means
of social ordering on the international level is entirely untested. The
crucial tension between competing private interests whose resolu-
tion suggests an efficient outcome is missing. State A and state B do
not have competing interests as to their separate treatment of their
own nationals. 
This means that a series of purely private decisions outside the
context of interaction is not a Hayekian “ordering” at all. The
private practice lacks socially normative content. If, as the conse-
quence of numerous private decisions, nobody smokes cigarettes at
home, it is hard to see why a court should prevent someone from
having a cigarette at home should they choose to do so. Yet an
observation that no one smokes in a workplace might provide some
support for a court to uphold the termination of someone employed
under a for-cause contract who begins to smoke on the job.
One may object that all states interact with each other constantly
by expressing approval or disapproval of conduct. Even states
removed from the actual conduct that forms custom participate in
it through their expressions of praise and blame. This broad view of
“interaction” confuses primary and secondary conduct. The “gossip”
among states about the propriety of a given course of conduct may
be the enforcement mechanism for norm violation.240 That is, it is
part of the price of not following the custom, and will be reflected,
along with all other cost and benefit information, in a state’s
decision about how to act. But decisions made at the point of action
incorporate the fullest range of information. Moreover, only action
by states that play reciprocal roles helps to build efficient norms,
because such nations will face both the costs and benefits of the
custom.241 Nations offering opinions, however, may never be on
either side of the custom, and thus their judgments more likely
would be affected by exogenous strategic considerations, such as
ideological sympathy, military alliance, or ethnic solidarity.
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CONCLUSION
Law sometimes adopts norms developed through informal, diffuse
processes because such customs, under certain circumstances,
improve the welfare of the group in which they developed. Thus
even if the wisdom of a custom is not evident on its face, it may have
a strong presumption in favor of it. However, international customs
develop in a context lacking the features that direct the develop-
ment of group norms toward efficiency. The absence of homogeneity,
repeat dealings, and reciprocal roles in many international settings
should significantly reduce one’s confidence that CIL norms are
welfare improving.
Of course, this does not prove that international customs are
inefficient, either as a group or individually. And it says nothing
about whether they are normatively desirable by some other
criteria, such as morality. Rather, it merely shows that the custom-
ary origin of international norms is no assurance of their benefi-
cence. Still, this is an important point, as international law legalizes
customary norms without any independent inquiry into their
desirability. Moreover, international law adopts customs much more
readily than private law, although customs in the latter context
have a much greater indicia of efficiency than in the former. 
The social norms literature on efficient custom has cautionary
implications for CIL in its current broad form. But it also suggests
that certain international contexts will be more likely to produce
efficient norms than others. This offers numerous possibilities for
reorganizing CIL around efficient norms. The factors supporting
efficient custom might exist among certain subglobal communities
of nations—these communities might be regional, economic, or even
epistemic. And efficient custom will be more likely to arise in
relation to certain substantive issues, such as diplomatic relations,
and unlikely to arise in regard to issues such as war. This suggests
that the central error of CIL is global and transsubstantive in
nature. One does not think that the industry customs of commodity
traders should be binding on all other commercial actors. Nor
should one think that the practices of a large group of nations would
be efficient when applied to all nations. Instead of seeking to
establish a single uniform rule of CIL, the task of international
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lawyers should be to search for areas of law and groups of states
that generate welfare-enhancing customs.
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